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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

U.C. C. § 5-114: Party claimingholder in due course status in a letter
of credit transactionhas the burden of proving such status.
Designed to facilitate the flow of international commerce by
providing shippers with positive assurances of payment for goods
shipped, Uniform Commercial Code section 5-114(1)1" provides that
an issuer of a letter of credit must honor a draft drawn, or demand
made, upon the credit regardless of whether the goods conform to
the underlying contract.2"8 The Code recognizes, however, that there
may be instances in which the customer or issuer needs protection
from the wrongful acts of either the beneficiary or holders of drafts
drawn on a credit. Accordingly, section 5-114 permits a court to
enjoin the honor of. a draft or demand when there is "fraud in the
transaction,"' 9 except as against a holder in due course. 2 1 Section
N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (McKinney 1964), provides in pertinent part:
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform
to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the
beneficiary.
1 The letter of credit substantially reduces the seller's risks in commercial transactions
since the documentary transaction generally is completed and the irrevocable credit established at a bank before the seller begins performance of the contract. The customer pays the
issuer to issue a letter of credit, which is drawn so as to permit the beneficiary-seller to draw
drafts on it. Upon issuance of the letter of credit, the beneficiary may receive notification
from an advising bank. Once the advising bank has notified the beneficiary that the irrevocable credit has been issued, payment to the seller may not be defeated if the seller performs
the contract in good faith and presents the requisite documentation to the issuer. Further,
because a holder in due course takes a letter of credit free from all contractual claims, the
letter is highly marketable. This allows a beneficiary to sell the credit prior to execution of
the contract and obtain funds with which to perform the contract. For definitions of terms
relevant to letters of credit, see N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-103 (McKinney 1964). See generally J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 601-06 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. See also N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-103, official comments, at 653-54
(McKinney 1964).
2c2N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (McKinney 1964). The Code is silent as to the definition of
fraud in the transaction. Professors White and Summers state that the term implies egregious
fraud, and not merely fraud in the inducement. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 208, at 625.
Section 5-114, which provides protection against fraud in the transaction, incorporates much
of the common law as enunciated in Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc.
719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941). In the Sztejn case, the seller shipped
"cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish" instead of the bristles called for in the
contract. After shipping the "merchandise," the seller obtained the proper documents and
submitted them to a bank, which presented the papers to the issuer for payment. The buyer
then sought injunctive relief to prevent the issuer from paying the draft. Finding that the
presenting bank was merely an agent for the seller rather than a holder in due course, the
court held that the bank was not entitled to payment under the draft. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d
at 635. See B. KoZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LTrEsRS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 285-88 (1966),
reprinted in R. SPIEDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAw

1252-54 (2d ed. 1974).
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5-114(2) (a) specifically references article 3 of the Code in discussing
holder in due course21 but does not indicate which party has the
burden of proving such status. In United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., the Court of Appeals unanimously held
that once fraud in the transaction is established, the burden of
proving holder in due course status is upon the person seeking to
213
obtain payment of a draft by invoking that status.
Defendant Cambridge, the purchaser-customer, ordered
twenty-eight thousand pairs of boxing gloves from Duke Sports, a
Pakistani company. At the request of plaintiffs, two Pakistani
banks who financed the sale, an irrevocable letter of credit naming
Duke as beneficiary was issued by Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company of New York. Subsequently, Duke advised that it was
unable to meet the delivery date specified in the contract. Cambridge immediately terminated the contract and notified one of the
Pakistani banks of the cancellation. Despite the cancellation, Duke
obtained documents evidencing shipments of boxing gloves and
drew drafts on the credit payable to plaintiff banks.21 1 When it subsequently was discovered that Duke had shipped "old, unpadded,
ripped, and mildewed gloves"215 instead of the new boxing gloves
ordered, Cambridge obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent
Manufacturers Hanover from honoring the drafts. Cambridge further proceeded to levy on the funds subject to the letter of credit
and was awarded a default judgment against Duke. 216 Claiming to
be holders in due course, the Pakistani banks instituted the present
action against Cambridge, seeking release of the levy and payment
of the drafts. 2 7 The trial court refused to entertain defendant's
210N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) (McKinney 1964) provides that despite a claim of fraud in

the transaction
[tihe issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded
by a. . .holder of the draft or demand which has taken the draft or demand under
the credit and under circumstances which would make it a holder in due course
211 N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (McKinney 1964), defines a holder in due course as a "holder
who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it
is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person."
212 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976), rev'g 49 App. Div. 2d 868,
374 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1st Dep't 1975) (mem.).
"1341 N.Y.2d at 257-58, 360 N.E.2d at 947, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
21 Id. at 256, 360 N.E.2d at 946, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
215Id.
211Id. at 257, 360 N.E.2d at 947, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
217 Id.
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claim of fraud in the transaction, finding that Cambridge first had
to demonstrate that plaintiffs were not holders in due course. Consequently, the lower court ordered that payment of the drafts be
made.218 This decision subsequently was upheld by the Appellate

Division, First Department.t 9
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that once fraud in the
transaction is established, a person claiming to be a holder in due
course in a letter of credit situation has the burden of proving such
status. 220 Observing that section 5-114(2) (a) makes reference to, and

draws upon, article 3 of the Code for other purposes, Judge Gabrielli
reasoned that it is logical to employ the article 3 burden of proof
rules as well.2"' Therefore, the court concluded, once the defense of
fraud in the transaction is shown, the burden of proving holder in
due course status is on the party demanding payment by virtue of
22

2
such status.

2'" 49 App. Div. 2d at 868, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 639. Cambridge had never denied the signatures on the drafts, and they therefore were deemed admitted. Id. at 868, 374 N.Y.S.2d at
639-40.'The N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-307(1) (McKinney 1964), provides that "[u]nless specifically
denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted." Thus, once the signatures were admitted, absent additional evidence, the plaintiffs were entitled to payment. 49
App. Div. 2d at 868, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 640. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-307(2) (McKinney 1964) which
states: "When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles
a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense."
1 49 App. Div. 2d at 868, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
2 41 N.Y.2d at 265, 360 N.E.2d at 952, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
"' Id. at 262, 360 N.E.2d at 950, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 272. Under the article 3 burden of proof
rules, "[aifter it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the rights of a holder in
due course has the burden of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in
all respects a holder in due course." N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-307(3) (McKinney 1964). Thus, to prevail
on the claim of holder in due course status, the banks must show they had no notice of the
fraud prior to accepting the drafts. See id. § 3-302(1)(c).
222 41 N.Y.2d at 262, 360 N.E.2d at 950, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 3307, official comment 3 (McKinney 1964). The Court of Appeals found no evidence in the
record that plaintiffs were holders in due course, so it dismissed their petition. 41 N.Y.2d at
265, 360 N.E.2d at 952, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
A related issue before the Court concerned the admissibility of certain evidence bearing
on plaintiffs' alleged holder in due course status. Before trial, Cambridge had sought to
depose the Pakistani banks. Since this request was denied, Cambridge used written interrogatories as a substitute. At trial, the banks introduced only the answers to the interrogatories
into evidence. This evidence was objected to by Cambridge as conclusory and self-serving.
The banks claimed that the answers were admissible pursuant to an exception to CPLR
3117(a) (2). CPLR 3117(a) (2) provides that an adverseparty may introduce answers to interrogatories for any purpose, to the extent they otherwise are admissible by the rules of evidence.
The exception to CPLR 3117 invoked by the banks allows either party to use interrogatory
answers against a party who was present or represented at the time they were taken if the
witness is more than 100 miles from the situs of the trial or is beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. CPLR 3117(a)(3)(ii). The trial court reasoned that since defendant Cambridge had
caused the interrogatories to be used, it was in no position to argue that it lacked an opporti-
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The decision in United Bank is in consonance with the plain
language of the Code and in accord with prior case law.22 3 It is

submitted that in factual settings involving the fraudulent shipment of totally worthless merchandise, such as United Bank, the
defrauded buyer should be afforded the protection of section 5-114
by having the onus of proving holder in due course status placed
upon the party seeking payment. If this burden is not met, the
party victimized by fraud in the transaction will be protected. On
the other hand, should the holder carry the burden, his claim will
be sustained in the face of an accusation of fraud. This is in keeping
with the Code's underlying philosophy that as between two innocent
parties, the one farthest from the fraud should be protected. 241 As a

result of the United Bank decision, a practitioner pursuing an action
in which he is seeking to claim holder in due course status in connection with article 5 of the Code must be prepared to carry the burden
of proving such status.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE

Evidence of habitual carelessness held admissible to establish
plaintiff's negligence in products liability action.
New York courts uniformly have excluded evidence of habitual
carelessness in negligence actions, deeming proof of such behavior
nity to cross-examine. 41 N.Y.2d at 264, 360 N.E.2d at 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 273. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that where the party serving the interrogatories does not have
the opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the party offering the answers, the exception
contained in CPLR 3117(a)(3)(ii) is not satisfied and the answers are inadmissible. Noting
that the exception to CPLR 3117 requires that "the absence of a witness must not have been
procured by the party seeking to offer a deposition or responses to interrogatories," the Court
also found the answers inadmissible because the plaintiff banks had refused to produce a
prospective witness and objected to a deposition. 41 N.Y.2d at 265, 360 N.E.2d at 952, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 274 (citing CPLR § 3117(a)(3)(ii)). In the Court's opinion, this was tantamount
to procuring the absence of a witness from the jurisdiction. 41 N.Y.2d at 265, 360 N.E.2d at
952, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
223 See Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.2d 711 (1st
Cir. 1969); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941). In Banco Espanol the buyer and seller failed to agree upon the precise
shipping documents required to collect on the letter of credit. Judge Coffin, in applying the
Massachusetts Code, had no doubt that once a defense of improper documentation was
established, § 5-114(2) and article 3 placed the burden of proof upon the party seeking to
claim holder in due course protection.
"I The United Bank Court noted that while contrary authority exists, the better view is
that as between two innocent parties, the party who chooses to deal with fraudfeasors should
bear the ultimate loss. Thus, fraud on the part of the seller may not be used by a buyer to
defeat the rights of a holder in due course. 41 N.Y.2d at 261 n.6, 360 N.E.2d at 949 n.6, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 271 n.6. See generally N.Y.U.C.C. § 5-114, commentary at 686-89 (McKinney
1964).

